This paper argues that one of the most important decisions in designing and deploying censorship resistance systems is whether one set of system options should be selected (the best), or whether there should be several sets of good ones. We model the problem of choosing these options as a cat-and-mouse game and show that the best strategy depends on the value the censor associates with total system censorship versus partial, and the tolerance of false positives. If the censor has a low tolerance to false positives then choosing one censorship resistance system is best. Otherwise choosing several systems is the better choice, but the way traffic should be distributed over the systems depends on the tolerance of the censor to false negatives. We demonstrate that establishing the censor's utility function is critical to discovering the best strategy for censorship resistance.
Achieving censorship resistance
Anonymous communication systems provide a powerful tool for Internet denizens to speak out against oppression by protecting their identities. Censorious regimes try to limit access to such systems to further control their populations. This paper discusses how to best provide censorship-resistant access to these anonymous communication systems. We use Tor as a case study, but the principles discussed here apply equally well to other systems. Any such system is built of at least two components: one to resist blocking by IP address, and another to resist blocking based on payload. Additionally, the system might be designed to resist active probing among other properties as deemed suitable to combat the threats posed to the system and its users and operators.
IP-address blocking resistance
IP-address blocking resistance is achieved by having a wide variety of IP addresses that will provide access to the network, possibly in combination with distributing IP addresses to users of the network such that the censor is not able to discover them. "Bridges" [1] are Tor's approach to this part of the problem. Here, Tor users in countries that do not block access to the Tor network are encouraged to run a Tor node that is not listed in the public Tor directory. IP addresses of bridges are distributed such that an adversary with limited resources (in particular, IP addresses and Gmail email addresses) is unable to enumerate all bridges. By making it as easy as possible to set up bridges, it was hoped there would be many, and the distribution strategy was designed such that Tor users in countries that block Tor will be able to find at least one IP address that the censor does not know about. Tor's strategy has been successful; while China was able to discover and block a large proportion of bridges, Tor users in other countries from which access to the Tor network is blocked by IP address still can use bridges.
An alternative approach to be proposed is to have a relatively small number of bridge nodes accessible via a very large number of IP addresses. These IP addresses are shared with other services. This is done to avoid wasting IP addresses and, more importantly, also to force censors to block access to important services that are not banned in the country. This threat of collateral damage, through false positives, is to discourage attempts to block the IP addresses associated with the bridges. These goals are achieved through "Decoy Routing" [12, 2] , where network traffic destined to the anonymous communication system is steganographically tagged and sent to an IP address in a network which supports decoy routing. The border router for this network, or a specialized computer designed for this task, detects the tag and routes the traffic to the anonymous communication system.
Another similar approach is "triangle routing" [3] . In itself, this does not provide any additional IP addresses for accessing the anonymous communication network, so bridges or a similar approach is still required. What triangle routing achieves is to permit these bridges to be on low-bandwidth connections yet still offer high performance. Network traffic exiting the censored country does get relayed via the bridge node, to a network-entry node, but return traffic is sent directly from the network-entry node to the user, spoofing the IP address of the bridge.
Payload-blocking resistance
The advantage for the censor of IP-address based blocking is that standard IP routers are, by definition, capable of routing traffic based on IP address and can thus redirect or block traffic destined for certain IP addresses. However, more sophisticated routers and specialized censorship equipment is capable of looking within packets (known as Deep Packet Inspection, DPI) and blocking network traffic which fulfils particular criteria. Therefore censorship resistance systems must also disguise packet content. For the purpose of this paper the payloadblocking resistance will also include resisting blocking based on port number, packet timing and packet size and other payload characterisitics.
Impersonating nothing
One approach to payload-blocking resistance is for network traffic to have no static characteristics. Payload data is encrypted to appear indistinguishable from random; packet sizes and timings are also randomized. The encryption necessitates some sort of key agreement. This could be unauthenticated, such as simply sending the key in the clear at the start of the communication, or performing ephemeral Diffie-Hellman. The former option is vulnerable to network blocking equipment capable of extracting the key and decrypting subsequent traffic. The latter is resistant to passive attack, but vulnerable to an active man-in-the-middle. Alternatively, key agreement could be performed out of band or the client could be authenticated based on credentials exchanged out of band. One system that takes the "impersonating nothing" approach is obfs3 [9] . This is a wrapper around the Tor bridge protocol, which works by sending the obfuscation key in the clear at the start of the communication. Subsequent traffic is encrypted by AES under keys derived from the obfuscation key. As with normal Tor bridges, obfs3 can use any TCP port, and the choice made by the obfs3-bridge must be communicated to the user, along with the IP address. No attempt is currently made to hide packet timing or size. While obfs3 does not perform any authentication or integrity checks, it wraps the unmodified Tor protocol which does perform both.
Another system with similar goals is Dust [11] . Like obfs3, network traffic is indistinguishable from random, but it aims to resist both active and passive attack by relying on a password exchanged out of band. Dust also performs integrity checks and provides replay protection. While Dust can be used over both UDP and TCP (obfs3 is TCP only), it does not provide a reliable in-order transport if sent over UDP, so an additional layer would be needed before a TCP-based protocol such as Tor could be used with the UDP variant. Like obfs3, Dust also does not itself hide packet timings or lengths.
The advantage of the "impersonating nothing" approach is that it has no static payload signature that could be programmed into DPI equipment. However, such traffic is also unlike almost anything else seen on the Internet, so if DPI equipment can detect it, the false positive rate would likely be very low. One such test would be to measure the entropy of a communication stream, using one or more of the many tests for random number generators. Any traffic with a value that is higher than expected would be blocked. Performing such a test would be challenging because it cannot be expressed as a regular expression, which is the common interface exposed by DPI equipment for configuring new blocking rules. Additionally, some entropy tests have high RAM and CPU usage and so would be infeasible to run directly on high-bandwidth DPI equipment which only has a handful of CPU cycles for each packet, and store a few tens of bytes for each stream. Therefore a staged approach would be needed: efficient initial tests either for entropy or to exclude known protocols would be performed on all traffic, and only selected packets would be sent for subsequent processing.
Another way of blocking "impersonating nothing" protocols is through a whitelist. Only protocols which match a particular (perhaps port-dependent) signature would be permitted. As even encrypted traffic is commonly surrounded by an unencrypted header, it would be possible to find a set of DPI rules which would permit a substantial portion of network traffic. However, protocols which were not explicitly permitted would be blocked, and so there could be a substantial false-positive rate, especially for more obscure protocols. This falsepositive rate would increase if more protocols became indistinguishable from random, so one way for protocol designers to help censorship resistance would be to hide any protocol characteristics, even if they have no need for censorship resistance themselves.
Impersonating something
As an alternative, the censorship-resistance scheme could impersonate a particular network protocol. Tor already does this to some extent, by using TLS for its out-ermost cryptography layer. Initial versions of Tor made no attempt to appear like web browsing, and so Tor TLS connections included a number of distinctive characteristics such as static fields in certificates and an unusual set of ciphersuites. Later, the Tor TLS options were made closer to that of common web browsers and web servers, by randomizing certificate fields and selecting ciphersuites commonly seen on the Internet.
However, Tor differs from typical encrypted web browsing in one important way, which is that connections between Tor relays depends on bidirectional authentication, rather than only server-to-client. In the initial version of Tor, the client certificate was sent unencrypted and thus could be used to block traffic. In later versions of Tor, the client certificate is sent during a renegotiation phase, which is encrypted. Unfortunately, the fact that renegotiation is being performed can be inferred from the plaintext in the network traffic, because the type of a TLS record is not encrypted, and a client certificate is of a different type from the application data which would be expected after TLS key exchange.
Efforts are underway to make Tor traffic even closer to encrypted web browsing. So far these include using more commonly seen Diffie-Hellman parameters, and extending the expiry time of certificates to be more plausible. The next step to be taken will be to disguise the renegotiation step, by implementing client-to-server authentication within the Tor protocol itself.
However, impersonating TLS is not a silver bullet. TLS is very common, and blocking TLS would cut off access to many useful Internet services, but countries have been willing to do so. Iran, in particular, has blocked TLS across much of the country for periods of time [8] . While partial, these blocks were at precisely the time that access to an anonymous communication network would be most important. For this reason, Tor supports "pluggable transports", which are external programs responsible for obfuscating Tor traffic. obfs3 is one such pluggable transport, but it was always intended that there be many such available, taking a variety of approaches. Such approaches do not only include the obfuscation technique, but also development practiceswhile Tor is open source, there is no reason that an pluggable transport could not be distributed as an obfuscated binary if that was considered to make it hard to reverse engineer and block. Existing pluggable transports include impersonating HTTP traffic like StegaTorus [10] and impersonating Skype traffic like SkypeMorph [4] .
Scanning resistance
Being accessible at a wide variety of IP addresses, and disguising payload, are sufficient for resisting passive blocking. However, more sophisticated adversaries may also perform active attacks by scanning IP addresses and detecting whether they are entry points for an anonymous communication network.
One option would be to proactively scan IP addresses-perhaps identified through some survelliance means to reduce the address space-to check if anonymous communication software is listening; another is to target scanning based on network surveillance. China has taken the latter approach, by recording which IP addresses are contacted by computers in China over TLS where the ciphersuite list matches the one used by Tor [7] . Shortly after such a connection, another computer in China probes the IP address and attempts to establish a Tor circuit, and if successful, the IP address is blocked. This approach has allowed China to almost completely block access to non-obfuscated Tor bridges.
To resist such probing, there needs to be a way for anonymous communication nodes to distinguish between legitimate access and probing, and either fail to respond to probing or return content which the censor considers innocuous. This goal can be achieved by sharing a secret between the legitimate user and the access node, and designing an authentication scheme for which an authentication failure is indistinguishable from the node not being an access node. One such scheme is BridgeSPA [6] , which encodes an authentication token into the TCP initial sequence number and timestamp field, and simply rejects connections for which the authentication check fails.
Putting it all together
For each of the components of a censorship resistance system, there are a wide variety of options available.
Each of the options available has its own advantages and there is a trade-off between in terms of overhead, implementation and deployment difficulty, and security. One common question, however, is whether to put limited development effort into making one censorship resistance scheme that is highly resistant to blocking, or to spread effort over multiple, less robust methods. Which option is the best is more of a question of economic incentives rather than a purely technical decision. As such it depends on how both the censor and developer of the censorship resistance system value particular situations.
Censor costs
The costs of the censor are mainly in terms of political capital and financial capital. Political capital is spent by false positives (by annoying users of services that are not intended to be blocked, i.e. collateral damage) and false negatives (by failing to block sites that they should, i.e. information leakage). Financial capital is spent on blocking equipment and engineering time adding and testing new blocking rules and the variable cost of deploying such a system to suit the scale of traffic being monitored.
Neither cost function is necessarily in direct proportion to the underlying quantities; there could easily be discontinuities. It may also be that these costs are step functions where costs stay the same until some threshold limit after which the costs skyrocket. Knowing these threshold limits is key in deploying, and overcoming, economically sound censorship systems.
Modelling the Cost of Censorship
We now move towards establishing a model for quantifying the cost of censorship. As noted above it is difficult to establish the true total cost of censorship, such as the cost of developing and training the technology, maintaining it, and the associated cost of failure -political and financial. To get around this shortcoming we shift our focus to the accuracy of the censor's tools and use it as a proxy to understand the magnitude of the costs.
Technological Limits
Censorship technology is limited by shortcomings in the languages used to define classification expressions, the computational and memory costs of real-time processing and the partial view of the attack surface amongst other considerations. It is important, then, to take in to account the rate at which objects of interest are misclassified. The two types of errors-false positives and false negativesgovern the confidence the censor has in their censorship apparatus. The prevalence of each of these type of errors provides an important input for both the censor and the defender in defining their respective strategies.
The base rate bias further thwarts accurate detection in favour of misclassification when the censor's false positive rate is comparable in size to, or larger than, the incidence rate of the defender's traffic. In such a case, a significant proportion, if not almost all, of the traffic selected for censoring will be false positives.
False Positives
From the censor's perspective, false positives are the legitimate traffic, and users, that were misclassified and blocked-the collateral damage. The censor naturally seeks to keep this as low as is acceptable. Without censor cooperation it is difficult to learn the cost of collateral damage, if indeed the censor is even able to evaluate this cost itself. However, we can assign a proxy value based on how many citizens were potentially inconvenienced. While this most likely does not align with the censor's values they can provide an independent measure of the cost of collateral damage in terms of disgruntled citizens and hence upward pressure on political costs.
As a strategy, collateral damage has been leveraged by numerous censorship resistance systems. However, in most cases the defender assumes an all-or-nothing approach to censorship, which can be limiting when the censor is content with partial blocking. The defender's, and client's, costs are in terms of effort to impersonate legitimate protocols since this would give the highest rate of false positives. The defender must also be careful to keep the rate of incidence of defender traffic low if they seek to maximize the amount of collateral damage caused.
False Negatives
The censor tries to prevent as many clients as it can from circumventing its blocks-termed information leakage. Due to the limits of technology it is unable to identify all of them. The cost to the censor is entirely in terms of political capital. Since it is hard to quantify the censor's cost, indeed he may also not be able to evaluate it in measurable terms, we use circumventing client connections as an objective proxy. Again, the censor may not have the same evaluation; nevertheless the fact remains that the censorship apparatus has failed in some manner and the circumventing connections are points of success for the defender.
The defender's aim is always to have as much, if not all, of its traffic classified as a (false) negative. The use of traffic morphing, steganography, and encryption to name a few techniques, are instrumental in achieving this goal.
Bringing it Together
The cost to the censor will depend on numerous factors, including the equipment and expertise necessary to implement censorship, but for simplicity we will assume that the utility to the censor is only a function of the false positives and false negatives of the blocking. Moreover, we will assume that the cost of blocking a protocol is proportional to how popular the protocol is, whereas in practice users are more likely to tolerate some protocols being blocked than others. However the analysis techniques we outline do not depend on these assumptions and could be generalised if necessary.
As an example, we shall use the following function to model the censor's utility in our analysis. The constants C and D control the tolerance of the censor to false positives and false negatives respectively. The variable t is the percentage of the target protocol blocked (i.e. the true positives) and f is the percentage of other traffic blocked (i.e. the false positives).
This function allows a wide range of plausible censor utility functions to be modelled, and results in a value between −100 (maximum dissatisfaction) and +100 (maximum satisfaction)
The Censorship Game
We model the cat-and-mouse game of censor vs. censorship resistant communications provider (the distributor in our terminology) as a multi-round game. The distributor moves first, and provides software which impersonates one or more protocols and distributes user traffic over these protocols according to some probability distribution. The censor then obtains a copy of the software, and is able to establish which protocols are being impersonated and in which proportion. The impersonation is sufficiently good that the censor must choose to either block a protocol entirely -blocking both cover traffic (causing false positives) and the distributor's traffic (causing true positives), or leaving it entirely unblocked.
We let the censor move second because it is likely that the censor can move faster than the distributor because the distributor must roll out new software to many thousands of users in order to change strategy whereas the censor needs only to make a configuration change. In each round the censor will choose a blocking strategy to maximize their utility function. The goal of the traffic distributor is to find the traffic probability distribution function such that the censor's best strategy is the one the distributor finds most acceptable. This will be the equilibrium strategy since if either party changes their choice, they will decrease their own utility.
An interesting consequence of this model is that the utility function of the censorship resistant communications provider does not matter, as all they can do is choose between the collection of scenarios which the censor has decided to be optimum for a particular strategy of the distributor. Therefore, as long as the distributor's utility function is monotonically decreasing in terms of the true positive rate, the same equilibrium will be reached regardless of the function's shape.
False-positive intolerant censor
We first consider a censor with low tolerance to false positives. We define this to mean that there is at least one protocol which they are unwilling to block (a critical protocol), even if this would result in blocking 100% of the distributor's traffic. In this case the distributor should choose critical protocol and send all censorshipresistance traffic over it. The censor will not block it, and so 100% of traffic will get through. Any alternative strategy for the distributor would be less good, as choosing multiple critical protocols would be more effort for no gain, and choosing a non-critical protocol for some traffic might lead the censor to block it.
False-positive tolerant censor
A more interesting case is where there is no such critical protocol. To give a concrete example, assume that the distributor can impersonate all of the top 6 protocols from a 2014 survey of US Internet traffic [5] : YouTube (13.25%), HTTP (8.47%), BitTorrent (5.03%), SSL (2.63%), MPEG (2.44%), and Amazon Video (2.37%).
As the censor utility function, we use Equation 1 with C = −0.015 and D = 1.75. This is illustrated on Figure 1 for three values of true positive rates: 100% (top), 50% (middle) and 0% (bottom).
We now need to compute the censor utility function for all combinations of censor strategy and distributor strategy. The censor can choose to block any selection of protocols of the 6 considered (there is no reason to block any others). As a result there are 2 6 = 64 scenarios.
The distributor can choose any probability distribution, but we exclude any distribution where the traffic distributed over protocol a is greater than the proportion distributed over protocol b when the proportion of cover traffic going over protocol b is greater than that of a. We do this because if any excluded scenario were chosen, if a and b were swapped, the censor utility function would be lower for every censor scenario (assuming the censor prefers a lower false-positive rate).
Even making this assumption there are still an infinite number of distributor scenarios, so to reduce the number we quantize all proportions to be a multiple of 5, resulting in 282 distributor scenarios. The result of simulating all scenarios is shown on Figure 2 , where blue is low utility and red is high utility. The censor scenarios to the left have low false positives; those to the right have high false positives. The distributor scenarios at the top have traffic heavily skewed to the protocols with most cover traffic; those at the bottom have traffic more evenly distributed over protocols. Rectangles show the optimum censor strategy for each distributor strategy (red for the equilibrium and black for others).
Even small changes in the distributor scenarios results in large changes in optimum censor scenario, but the equilibrium is to distribute traffic quite evenly over protocols, but not completely. The top 5 protocols should each get 20% of traffic with the 6th not used at all. The censor will block protocols 2, 3, 4 and 5 allowing 20% of the distributor traffic through. Were the attacker to block protocol 1, the additional false-positives would not justify the extra 20% of true positives. Were the distributor to move some traffic onto protocol 6, it would be blocked because it has a smaller false-positive cost. Let us now consider a censor who is equally tolerant to false-positives, but far less tolerant to false-negatives than before, by changing D from 1.75 to 0.75 with the result shown in Figure 3 Now a 50% false negative rate is significantly below zero for all false positives, whereas before it would have been positive if the false positive rate was low. The resulting simulation is significantly different, as can be seen in Figure 4 . Now the optimum strategy for the censor is almost always to block many protocols, resulting a high falsepositives (the right hand side of the graph). The equilibrium strategy is for 95% of traffic to be distributed on protocol 1 and 5% to be distributed on protocol 2. The censor will block protocol 1, but leave protocol 2 unblocked. This lets only 5% of distributor traffic through, but it is better than the 0% which almost every other strategy results in. For example, sending 100% over protocol 1 results in protocol 1 being blocked. Sending 80% over protocol 1 and 10% over protocol 2 results in both protocols being blocked. Putting only 5% over protocol 2 is small enough that the extra benefit to the censor of blocking it is not large enough to justify the high false positives.
Conclusions
We have shown how to discover the equilibrium strategy for a censor-distributor cat-and-mouse game and show how the censorship resistance provider should distribute traffic over different protocols to impersonate. The equilibrium depends on the censor's utility function, but not that of the censorship resistance provider. If the censorship resistance provider is in the happy position of being able to impersonate a protocol which the censor is not willing to block, then only one protocol should be impersonated. If however the censor is willing to block even the most popular protocol, the best strategy is depends on the detail of the censor's utility function, and will result in distributing traffic over some, but perhaps not all protocols. Discovering this utility function is difficult, but if approximations can be found it may be possible to improve the approaches of current censorship resistance systems.
